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Abstract 
Based on comprehensive research among boat operators and navy personnel working on the 
Congo River (DRC), this article explores how assessments of ÔtaxationÕ are shaped by the 
interplay of legitimation and ÔofficialisationÕ. As such, it draws upon and contributes to scholarly 
debates on taxpayersÕ attitudes towards taxation. While boat operators resent having to pay a 
plethora of authorities, including the navy, along the Congo River, the article demonstrates how 
they locate these ÔtaxesÕ on a spectrum from more to less legitimate. These assessments are 
shaped by various factors: authoritiesÕ legitimacy as ÔmeasuredÕ by their official mandate and 
importance; public and non-official service provision; and the deployment of symbols of 
ÔstatenessÕ. In interaction, these factors legitimise and ÔofficialiseÕ ÔtaxesÕ by the navy that are 
prohibited in legislation. These findings caution against the a priori use of the labels ÔofficialÕ and 
Ônon-officialÕ, emphasising the need to better grasp these notionsÕ emic understandings.  
Keywords: taxation; informality; civil-military relations; African state; Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
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Introduction 
The marines are the boss of the river (kolo mai) and the ones who help us when we 
get in trouble in the waters. We donÕt complain about paying them. We think they 
are very useful. 
This assessment comes from a boat operator on the Congo River who transports 
agricultural produce from the inland of the former Bandundu province to Kinshasa, the 
capital city of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On his way to Kinshasa, he 
encounters no fewer than 20 government authorities at eight different posts. On average, 
total payments to these authorities amount to almost 14% of the overall costs of a single 
journey (Olsson, Eriksson Baaz and Martinsson 2016). Boat operators therefore lament 
how these ÔtaxesÕ kill their business. Yet the citation above conveys a rather positive 
assessment of one of the ÔtaxingÕ authorities; the marines, describing payments to them as 
somewhat legitimate.  
At first glance, this assessment appears rather strange. It articulates a positive image of 
the marines, despite the fact that the state security forces in the Congo have a rather bad 
reputation (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 2013). The assessment is also surprising in light 
of the general complaints among boat operators about the high fiscal burden they face. 
WhatÕs more, this boat operator expresses willingness to pay a ÔtaxÕ that had recently 
been prohibited by an inter-ministerial decree aimed at stopping harassment on the river. 
How then, can we understand his Ð and most other boat operatorsÕ that we interviewed Ð 
relatively positive evaluation of payments to the marines? When and why are certain 
payments to authorities in the Congo, herein labelled ÔtaxesÕ, seen as more or as less 
legitimate? This article explores these questions, based on comprehensive research 
among boat operators and navy personnel working on the Congo River. It thus aims to 
shed light on the processes and logics shaping views of ÔtaxationÕ in the Congo, with a 
specific focus on the role of ÔofficialityÕ, seen herein to relate to both rules and symbols.  
ÔTaxationÕ on the Congo River offers a particularly interesting case to explore the role of 
ÔofficialityÕ for several reasons. First, we found that the interministerial decreeÐadopted 
in 2014 Ð that bans the majority of ÔtaxesÕ on the river was widely known among boat 
operators. Therefore, the official rules governing ÔtaxationÕ seem relatively unambiguous, 
in particular when compared with other forms of taxation in the Congo (see Titeca and de 
Herdt 2011). Second, all authorities involved in ÔtaxationÕ are state agents, hence they can 
all deploy symbolic state power. Nevertheless, it emerged that some ÔtaxesÕ are still seen 
as more official than others, which allowed us to study the relative importance of the 
other factors shaping ÔofficialisationÕ. Finally, looking at ÔtaxationÕ on the Congo River is 
pertinent owing to the involvement of both military and civilian state agents. 
Consequently, we could explore to what extent the possibility of exercising armed force 
makes a difference in terms of assessments of ÔtaxationÕ.  
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As we will demonstrate, boat operators locate payments to authorities on a spectrum 
ranging from more to less legitimate, in ways that largely reflect the main factors 
emphasised in previous research on taxpayersÕ attitudes towards taxation: deterrence, 
reciprocity, social influences and (authoritiesÕ) legitimacy (Fjeldstad et al. 2012). Yet our 
data shows that such factors always work in interaction, rather than in a stand-alone 
manner. For instance, both ÔdeterrenceÕ and ÔreciprocityÕ need to be unpacked, by taking 
the complex workings of Ôsocial influencesÕ into account, in particular non-official logics 
such as patronage. Perceptions of the legitimacy of authorities and the ÔtaxesÕ they 
impose similarly draw upon notions of Ônon-officialityÕ, in particular authoritiesÕ ability 
to provide non-official services such as ÔtaxÕ reduction. This ability also functions as a 
form of ÔreciprocityÕ, which is hence not limited to public service provision. Thus, the 
article demonstrates how any effort to understand logics around ÔtaxationÕÐ including 
why certain ÔtaxesÕ persist in spite of being legally bannedÐmust probe deeply into emic 
understandings of ÔofficialityÕ and Ônon-officialityÕ.  
 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, we briefly discuss literature on African 
taxpayersÕ views of taxation and the role of ÔformalityÕ and ÔinformalityÕ in taxation 
practices. Subsequently, we account for the methodology used and the data upon which 
the article is based. The next section provides an insight into the studyÕs socio-economic 
context, describing the system of river ÔtaxationÕ and the naval forces. This paves the way 
for an in-depth discussion of the processes and logics shaping views of ÔtaxationÕ. We 
conclude by reviewing the ways in which these processes and logics interact in shaping 
assessments of ÔtaxationÕ, and the implications of our findings for understandings of Ôthe 
officialÕ and Ôthe non-officialÕ.  
Taxation, (de)legitimation and (in)formalisation  
In recent years, scholarly attention on taxation in Africa has intensified. This study draws 
on two strands of this emerging literature: first, debates on taxpayersÕ views, attitudes and 
behaviour towards taxation; and second, discussions of ÔformalityÕ and ÔinformalityÕ 
within taxation. In respect of the first, we make use of the study of Fjeldstad et al. (2012), 
which identifies a number of factors that shape African taxpayersÕ perceptions and 
behaviour towards taxation. These encompass: 1) economic deterrence; or perceptions of 
how difficult it is to evade taxation; 2) fiscal exchange or reciprocity, relating to 
perceived returns in terms of the provision of public goods and services; 3) Ôsocial 
influencesÕ, including group norms and behaviour toward taxation; and 4) the legitimacy 
of political institutions, which is in part shaped by perceptions of the fairness of the 
political system.  
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A second debate that we draw upon relates to what PrudÕhomme (1992, 2) terms  
Ôinformal taxationÕ. Reflecting earlier discussions on informality in the economy, 
scholars of taxation still grapple with conceptualising the ÔinformalÕ and  Ônon-stateÕ 
spheres and the relations of these spheres to the ÔformalÕ and ÔstateÕ domains. While some 
see informal revenue extraction by state agents primarily in terms of ÔpredationÕ, 
negatively impacting state legitimacy and the economy (on Congo, e.g. Rackley 2006), 
others highlight its constitutive role in service provision and the reproduction of Ôthe 
stateÕ (on Congo, e.g. Trefon 2009). Similar to Roitman (2004), we prefer the terms 
ÔofficialÕ and Ônon-officialÕ to ÔformalÕ and ÔinformalÕ, not only as the term ÔinformalÕ has 
become an empty signifier (Ibid.), but also as ÔofficialityÕ better fits the modes of 
reasoning and narratives encountered in the research context. 
Since the 2000s, the discussion on non-official revenue generation by state agents in 
AfricaÐwhether labelled ÔtaxationÕ or ÔcorruptionÕÐ has become linked to debates on 
governance and statehood in Africa more generally (e.g. Lund 2006; Hagmann and 
Pclard 2010; Titeca and De Herdt 2011). These debates have given rise to a consensus 
that governance and (public) authority are produced through the interplay of both official 
and non-official actors, logics and practices. Highlighting the porousness of state/society 
and public/private boundaries, Lund (2006) coins the term Ôtwilight institutionsÕ to 
describe how Ôrules, controls and in particular their legitimisation, resist unequivocal 
situation in either ÒstateÓ or ÒsocietyÓÕ (2006, 689). Inspired by Hansen and StepputatÕs  
(2001) notion of Ôlanguages of statenessÕ, he also emphasises the importance of signs and 
symbols of stateness within the exercise of public authority, including bureaucratic 
idioms and administrative regalia such as contracts and stamps. The deployment of such 
symbols affects the legitimation of authority, which, as Moore (1988) reminds us, is an 
ongoing and dynamic process that is ill captured by the static label ÔlegitimacyÕ. The 
legitimation of authority, in turn, shapes and is shaped by practices of taxation. While the 
extractive practices of authorities seen as legitimate will sooner appear licit, taxation seen 
as unjust will undermine authoritiesÕ legitimacy (Roitman 2004; Juul 2006; Sikor and 
Lund 2009). What role ÔofficialityÕ plays within these processes of legitimation, however, 
remains only partly understood. 
As PrudÕhomme (1992) discovered in his research on Zaire (as the Congo was formerly 
called), forms of non-official ÔtaxationÕ are not necessarily considered illegitimate. 
Commenting on ÔrequisitionsÕ (goods and services provided to state agents), he observed 
that Ôa number of businesspeople seem to consider these É as quite normal and part of 
good neighborly relationshipsÕ. This indicates Ôthat they benefit from good relationships 
with local authorities, perhaps in the form of favourable tax treatmentÕ (1992, 6). 
Similarly, Prichard and Van den Boogaard (2017, 181) observe that at markets in 
Northern Ghana, taxpayers appear willing to pay non-official ÔtaxesÕ to Ôavoid disrupting 
the social order, to Òkeep the peaceÓ within the market, to avoid public embarrassment, or 
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to maintain good relations with tax collectorsÕ. PrudÕhomme (1992) also emphasises how, 
in the face of low wages and the limited resources allocated for operational expenditure, 
non-official ÔtaxÕ payments allow state agents to exercise their official function and 
engage in public service delivery. As we demonstrate below, this contribution to 
authoritiesÕ daily work is clearly reflected  in boat operatorsÕ justifications of payments 
made to the navy. These justifications therefore seem to reflect what Olivier de Sardan 
(2015, 29) has coined Ôpalliative practical normsÕ that is, norms that Ôdeviate from the 
letter of explicit norms, but É have the objective to rescue the ÒspiritÓ of public service 
deliveryÕ. 
  
The above-mentioned studies all point to the complex interplay between Ôthe officialÕ and 
Ôthe non-officialÕ within taxation and its legitimation. As Prichard and Van den Boogaard 
(2017,181) emphasise, understandings of both legality and legitimacy are Ôsubjective and 
context-specificÕ. Yet few studies systematically explore when and why taxation 
practices are perceived and experienced as ÔofficialÕ and Ônon-officialÕ, by taxpayers and 
tax collectors alike. They rather use these labels as a priori categorisations, which may 
cloud our understanding of the processes by which practices, including ÔtaxationÕ, come 
to be construed as ÔofficialÕ or Ônon-officialÕ.  
In Congo-specific studies, however, a growing body of work examines certain 
dimensions of the construction of  ÔofficialityÕ. For instance, Titeca and de Herdt (2011) 
point out that within the Congo, the official rules are often not known or divergently 
interpreted, rendering the boundaries of Ôthe officialÕ very malleable (see also Titeca and 
Kimanuka 2012). Studying interactions between Congolese civil servants and economic 
operators, Rubbers (2007) observes that the ways in which the boundaries between Ôthe 
officialÕ and Ônon-officialÕ are drawn reflect the outcome of complex negotiations 
involving appeals to legislation and official symbols. These observations point to the 
need to approach ÔofficialisationÕ and Ôde-officialisationÕ as processes, rather than as 
fixed qualities. For the same reason, we refrain from labelling what we call ÔtaxationÕ 
here (between quotation marks to indicate the contested nature of this labelling) as either 
ÔofficialÕ or Ônon-officialÕ.  
Some notes on methodology  
The material used in this article was collected between 2013 and 2015 by the authors and 
two researcher assistants and consists of two different data sources.
1
 The first comprises 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with boat operators in the Kinshasa, Kinkole and 
Maluku areas. These interviews focused on the structure of their business activities and 
their perceptions of the various authorities enacting ÔtaxationÕ. Owing to the importance 
of attending to the perspectives of the authorities collecting the ÔtaxesÕ (given that this 
shapes the ways they perform ÔtaxationÕ, which may in turn influence how it is 
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experienced by taxpayers) we also conducted interviews with marines. The choice fell on 
the marines since they constitute one of the main ÔtaxÕ collectors, and since their 
ÔtaxationÕ was totally banned by the 2014 decree (in contrast to some other authorities Ð 
see below). The interviews with the marines focused on professional identities, 
perceptions of roles and mandates, as well as the organisation of ÔtaxÕ collection. 
The second source of data consists of a survey held between February and June 2015 
among in total 137 boat operators. The survey was taken in Lingala and developed in 
consultation with the Union congolaise des armateurs des baleinires (UCAB), the 
Congolese Union for Operators of Whaleboats. The latter is the most common type of 
boat used on the Congo River made of wood. The survey was held among boat operators 
who had just arrived in Kinshasa (mostly in the Kinkole area) from journeys on either the 
Lukenie or the Kasai rivers, which are tributaries to the Congo. Several measures were 
taken to ensure the quality of the collected data, including the use of logbooks when 
filling in the survey (see Olsson, Eriksson Baaz and Martinsson 2016, for more details). 
Aside from questions about their business and the contributions paid to each authority at 
each post, the survey included questions about views of ÔtaxationÕ and the various 
authorities involved. In particular, boat operators were asked what authorities were useful 
and authorised to operate and ÔtaxÕ and why. The article draws predominantly on this 
qualitative part of the survey, which was quite rich, given that the survey interviews were 
voice recorded whenever permitted. Yet for a number of crucial insights, the article is 
primarily based on the in-depth interviews, which helped uncover certain practicesÐ
particularly the use of the marines to reduce ÔtaxationÕÐ that were rarely mentioned 
during the survey interviews.  
Since boat operating is a male dominated occupation, no women were encountered. The 
average operator was about 47 years old and had approximately nine years of experience 
(see Olsson, Eriksson Baaz and Martinsson 2016). No significant variations in views 
were found among those with different age or experience, which warrants the treatment 
of Ôboat operatorsÕ as a relatively homogeneous group herein. In the following, we further 
describe the system of river ÔtaxationÕ as relayed by the boat operators, and then zoom in 
on the marines. 
 
ÔTaxationÕ and naval forces on the river  
The Congo River is a crucial lifeline to Kinshasa, providing much needed produce from 
the hinterlands to its approximately 12 million inhabitants (Iazzolino 2016). While the 
road network connecting Kinshasa to the former Bandundu province (since 2015 split 
into the provinces of Mai-Ndombe, Kwilu and Kwango) has been somewhat rehabilitated 
in recent years, the bulk of agricultural goods are still transported via the waterways. One 
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boat can take between 500 and 1800 bags (of 50Ð70 kilograms each), depending on size. 
Many operators, however, overload their boats, which frequently leads to shipping 
disasters. The boat operators interviewed mainly transport maize and dried and non-died 
manioc (fufu and kimpuka), but also other goods such as peanuts, charcoal, dried fish and 
livestock. They also carry passengers, the majority of whom are small-scale traders 
bringing their merchandise to Kinshasa. Most operators transport merchandise both of 
passengers and of their own, but always strive to increase the proportion of their own 
goods to enhance their profits. The latter are on average USD 3,670 per journey 
(travelling downstream to Kinshasa), although many also make a loss. Average profits 
are not very high, especially in light of the turnover. The costs for buying agricultural 
produce alone (excluding petrol and other expenses)Ðconsidered essential to make a 
profit on the next trip downstreamÐcan amount to between USD 1,500 and 3,000.
2
 
Additionally, the amount of journeys made per year is limited, ranging between three and 
five, although some operators go even less frequently.   
River ÔtaxationÕ: a cacophony of authorities 
Most of the postsÐand concomitant ÔtaxingÕ authoritiesÐalong the Congo River and its 
tributaries emerged as a result of the areaÕs heavy militarisation during the Second Congo 
War (1998Ð2003) (Rackley 2006). For instance, during the time of Mobutu, there was 
only one administrative post between Oshwe and Kinshasa on the Lukenie line (in 
Kwamouth), while at present there are seven (interviews, November 2014). In the light of 
this multiplication of ÔtaxingÕ authorities, which had also occurred in other parts of the 
country, various associations of boat operators started a lobby to identify all ÔtaxesÕ 
levied on the waterways. This demand was eventually honoured, leading to an 
investigation conducted by government representatives and the UCAB (the whaleboat 
operatorsÕ association). This investigation found that nation-wide, no fewer than 17 
authorities (linked to eight different ministries)
3 
were levying in total 55 different types 
of contributions along the river (Arrte Interministriel 2014). In addition to ÔtaxesÕ 
collected at fixed posts, the state security forces, in particular the marines and the Police 
fluviale (river police), asked for contributions at so called postes flottantes (floating 
posts). The amounts of these different ÔtaxesÕ, which each had their own specific name, 
such as taxe visa arriv (arrival visa tax) or taxe visa dpart (departure visa tax), were 
reported to be more or less fixed. This fixity indicates that they were not arbitrarily 
imposed, but highly institutionalised.  
 
An inter-ministerial decree adopted on 19 June 2014 declared about two-thirds (38 out of 
55) of the ÔtaxesÕ illegal. However, some authorities remained with a right to impose a 
few contributions, such as the Commissariat fluvial (Riverine Commission, authorised to 
levy two out of twelve of the identified ÔtaxesÕ) and the Direction-gnrale de migration 
(Directorate-General of Migration) (authorised to levy one out of nine). Others, by 
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contrast, were banned from ÔtaxingÕ altogether, such as the Direction-gnrale des 
douanes et accises (Directorate-General of Customs and Duties), the Fond de promotion 
du tourisme (Fund for Tourism Promotion) and the Fond de promotion culturelle 
(Cultural Promotion Fund). A complete ban was also pronounced for the armed forces 
and other state security forces, such as the national intelligence agency and the river 
police. The ÔtaxÕ imposed by the provincial government of Bandundu on agricultural 
produce, the so-called recouvrement, was also forbidden.  This ÔtaxÕ is paid at Mushie 
post at the rate of 1500 Congolese francs (FC,) or USD 1.61 per bag, whatever the 
product.  
The survey among boat operators, which was conducted after the adoption of the 2014 
decree, indicates that, except for the initial months, the reform did not bring substantial 
changes. In Mushie, the provincial government still ÔtaxesÕ agricultural goods, which 
constitutes by far the heaviest ÔtaxÕ burden for boat operators: 65 per cent of total 
payments. The second biggest ÔtaxÕ collector is the Commissariat fluvial, receiving 7.5 % 
of total payments (on average USD 23 per payment). The third biggest receiver is the 
marines, getting 6.4 % of total payments, or the value of USD 11 per transaction (Olsson, 
Eriksson Baaz and Martinsson 2016). This contribution is divided into five litres of petrol 
(an amount that is always the same, highlighting the high level of institutionalisation of 
this type of ÔtaxationÕ) and the rest in cash. Since the main focus of this article is marine 
ÔtaxationÕ, a brief background to the naval forces is warranted.  
 
The Congolese navy: we are no Ôforces troublesÕ 
 
The Congolese navy is part of the Forces armes de la Rpublique dmocratique du 
Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the DRC). Countrywide, it is divided into four 
groupements navals (naval sectors), which are headed by the central marine command in 
Kinshasa. For this research, marines were contacted in the First Naval Sector, which is 
constituted of the rivers Congo, Ubangi, Kwilu, Kasai and their sub-rivers as well as 
Lake Ndombe. In addition to smaller posts along the river, the naval forces have one big 
camp in central Kinshasa (in Kingabwa, Limete), which is simply called Force Navale, 
and also hosts some of the marinesÕ families.
4
  While most of the boat operators 
contacted docked and offloaded goods in the harbour of Kinkole, some also went to 
Force Navale camp, which sometimes doubles as a civilian harbour, thereby constituting 
a source of income for the camp.  
 
The naval forces share many of the basic features of the Congolese infantry, which makes 
up the largest part of the FARDC. In October 2013, only 6,434 of the in total 144,681 
troops then registered were marines (interview army expert, November 2013). Similar to 
other parts of the army (and indeed the administration in general), the navy has minimal 
infrastructure, such as barracks and equipment. They have only a limited number of low-
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quality speedboats, particularly upstream, where they mainly use the same wooden boats 
as civilians. Moreover, they lack regular supplies of petrol, which limits their mobility. 
Like other state services in the Congo, salaries are irregular and low, ranging at present 
between USD 100 and 170 a month, depending on rank. This amount is far from 
sufficient for even a small family to live off.  
While scarce resources and low salaries foster engagement in revenue generation, naval 
ÔtaxationÕ should also be seen in the light of the salience of patronage networks and the so 
called ÔrapportageÕ system (Verweijen 2013). Like in other state security services 
(Eriksson Baaz and Olsson 2011; Schouten, Murairi and Batundi 2017), lower-level 
personnel in the naval forces are under pressure from those in the higher echelons to 
generate resources, commonly by extracting these from civilians. A large part of this 
money does not go to the soldiers themselves but is channelled higher up the command 
chain. Given that units and commanders who underperform in terms of harvesting 
resources are often deployed to zones with lesser revenue-generating opportunities and 
are denied promotion, the stakes of rapportage are high.  
As described below, marines interpret rapportage largely in terms of enabling their 
professional functioning, as viewed through the lens of their professional identity. Similar 
to many other naval forces globally, the Congolese marinesÐwho take strong pride in 
being in the navyÐ position themselves in relation to the infantry. They articulate a self-
image of being well trained, well educated and well disciplined, in particular when 
compared with the infantry, which they often label forces troubles (forces of trouble) 
(interviews, 2015). According to the marines contacted, one reason for their superiority is 
that in contrast to the infantry, only a few ex-rebel forces with limited military training 
were integrated into the naval forces after the end of the Second Congo War, especially 
so in the western parts of the country. Consequently, the navy there is to a large extent 
composed of soldiers who have always served in the government forces and who are 
relatively well educated, in terms of both general and military education. Furthermore, 
most navy personnel pertain to a particular generation that served in the army under the 
Mobutu presidency and are all quite old. These features might influence the ways these 
forces enact ÔtaxationÕ and are perceived by the population. Compared with other groups 
in the military, higher educated and older military personnel tend to more strongly invoke 
professional norms and identities, thereby instilling confidence that they are 
knowledgeable Ôsecurity professionalsÕ (Verweijen 2015).  
Making sense of boat operatorsÕ ÔtaxationÕ experiences 
As mentioned above, while the boat operators interviewed expressed resentment toward 
the system of ÔtaxationÕ as a whole, within their day-to-day interactions, they clearly 
located ÔtaxationÕ on a spectrum of legitimacy. Only a few boat operators displayed more 
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extreme attitudes, arguing that either all or none of the ÔtaxingÕ authorities were useful 
and mandated to be present. The two (out of 137) who argued that all are useful, 
mentioned that Ôthe state was not stupidÕ (lÕtat eza zoba te) and therefore must have its 
reasons to put the authorities there (interview, May 2015). The four who argued that none 
are useful labelled their practices as pure harassment (tracasseries). As one of them 
argued: Ônone of them are useful, they are just harassing us, they are all just thievesÕ 
(interview, May 2015). Yet the vast majority of boat operators provided a more nuanced 
picture, arguing that some authorities were indeed useful and had the right to ÔtaxÕ, but 
others not. In the following, we further analyse the factors shaping these assessments. 
First, we address understandings of authoritiesÕ legitimacy, as ÔmeasuredÕ by their official 
mandate and their importance, including their (perceived) capacity for deterrence. 
Second, we explore the dimension of public service provision and the deployment of 
symbols of stateness (relating to the fiscal exchange principle and social influences, 
respectively). Third, we attend to non-official service provision, which equally relates to 
fiscal exchange and social influences.  
AuthoritiesÕ legitimacy ÔmeasuredÕ by official mandates and importance 
With a few exceptions, the boat operators that were interviewed identified the 
Commissariat fluvial and the marines as the most useful authorities and as being 
legitimately present on the river, in both cases largely owing to their official mandate. 
Authorities perceived as lacking an official mandate to be present were generally deemed 
illegitimate. Consequently, their engagement in ÔtaxationÕ was seen as illegitimate too. 
This category included certain branches of the security services (such as the civilian and 
military intelligence services) and Ð above all Ð the provincial authorities levying the 
recouvrement. Interestingly, to emphasise the illegal status of this ÔtaxÕ, boat operators 
mentioned the 2014 decree particularly often, which indicates that this piece of 
legislation was widely known. Notions of illegality, however, were not invoked in 
relation to the contributions demanded by the naval forces, which the decree equally 
prohibits, pointing to the variegated ways in which Ôthe officialÕ and Ôthe non-officialÕ are 
interpreted and deployed.  
Accounts of the official mandate of the Commissariat fluvial, seen as having the most 
legitimate presence, generally highlighted that they are in charge of regulating river 
traffic and issuing permits. Thus, these narratives often featured wordings that the 
Commissariat is the ÔbossÕ or ÔmasterÕ of the river (mokonzi ya mai/kolo mai), being the 
authority of the river traffic. As one boat operator put it: Ôthe Commissariat fluvial, they 
are dealing with river traffic (ye nde atali ebale), the rest of them Ð except for the marines 
Ð what are they really doing there?Õ (interview, May 2015). Another commented: Ôthe 
Commissariat fluvial, are the guardians of the river traffic, they are like fathers, they can 
help you, but also shut you down (bakoki kobikisa pe koboma yo)Õ (interview, May 
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2015). Here, this operator (as others) refers to the role and authority of the Commissariat 
to issue and cancel navigation permits, which were clearly framed as issued by Ôthe stateÕ.  
The invocation of the capacity to Ôshut one downÕ draws attention to the ÔdeterrenceÕ 
principle mentioned earlier, which stipulates that the more difficult a particular tax is seen 
to avoid, the more willing people are to pay (Fjeldstadt et al. 2012).  In the case of the 
Commissariat, such ÔdeterrenceÕ is clearly related to it being the boss/master of the river 
and the associated dimension of coercion. As boat operatorsÕ narratives conveyed, 
however, the notion of boss/master bears stronger connotations of mastery/competence 
than of brute force. One indication of this is the comparison to ÔfathersÕ (see above), 
whoÐreflecting logics of patronage/protectionÐare associated with both sternness and 
benevolence. Hence, the notion of coercion inherent to the deterrence principle should be 
qualified, as it can assume different forms and degrees. 
As exemplified by the words of the boat operator opening this article, the marines were 
also referred to as the ÔbossÕ or ÔmasterÕ of the river. However, their official mandate was 
mostly described in terms of riverine rescue. The marines themselves similarly evoked 
their rescue mandate as legitimating their presence. In particular, they pointed to the 
specific section in the 2011 Defence Law that states that one of the functions of the naval 
forces is precisely to Ôassist ships, boats and aircraft in distress in territorial watersÕ (Loi 
organique 2011).
5
 They linked these tasks to the armyÕs (peace-time) mandate Ð as 
enshrined in the constitutionÐto Ôprotect the people (civilians) and their belongingsÕ 
(Ibid.). Yet the marines also read their activities on the river in the light of their duty to 
maintain order and bring security more generally. This duty is commonly broadly 
interpreted, and therefore includes tasks that are not specified in the marinesÕ official 
mandate, but that are considered to conform to its spirit, like upholding the law and 
ensuring public safety. One example is policing boat operators who seek to dodge the 
posts on the river to save money and time. As one marine put it: Ôwhen the boat operators 
sometimes try to skip a poste without signing the papers [at the authorities], we marines 
have to go out on the water to stop them and verify the documentsÕ (interview, October 
2014). As he and others explained, they are often the only authority that have 
boats/engines available and thus can stop boats trying to bypass the posts.  
The marinesÕ occasional wide interpretation of their mandate partly explains why the boat 
operators did not always portray them in a positive manner. Some argued that the marines 
at times exaggerate with ÔtaxationÕ (often seasonally, around Christmas and the start of 
the school year), and deliberately seek problems. As one operator explained: Ôthey say: 
Òwhy do you have passengers sitting on the roof!? Overload! (surcharge)Ó. So they also 
sometimes look for infractions in order to be able to augment the feesÕ (interview, March 
2015). Yet the articulation of complaints of ÔexaggerationÕ did not diminish the 
overarching sentiment of the relative legitimacy of the marineÕs presenceÐand relatedly 
	 12	
of their ÔtaxationÕÐwhich was clearly linked to their official mandate. Another reason for 
this relative sense of legitimacy was the marinesÕ perceived importance.  Similar to the 
Commissariat fluvial, this importance was partly read in relation to the naval forcesÕ 
potential to create difficulties, although it was also linked to its provision of useful 
services (see further below). The relatively positive views of naval ÔtaxationÕ thus shed a 
different light on the Ôdeterrence principleÕ: the more important the authority in terms of 
their capability to hinder boat operatorsÕ business, the more important it is to maintain 
good relations, hence to pay ÔtaxesÕ. 
Public service provision and symbols of stateness 
As indicated above, fiscal exchange was also found to play a prominent role in shaping 
views of river ÔtaxationÕ. Yet we observed that the experience of exchange is not a given 
but stems from complex interactions between service provision and other factors. The 
latter include the presence of symbols of statenessÐlike documentsÐwhich we consider a 
form of Ôsocial influencesÕ herein. 
The fiscal exchange principle appeared most strongly at work in the total delegitimation 
of the recouvrement (the provincial ÔtaxÕ). While the boat operators stated that the ÔtaxÕ 
was too hefty and illegal, they also lamented that they could not see any benefits from it. 
As one operator concluded: 
The money goes straight into the governorÕs pockets. So we are paying a lot of 
taxes for nothing. We see no changes, no new services, no development. If the 
taxes we pay are for real (eza relles) that is no problem. But what we see here 
that is something different (eza eloko mususu) (Interview, March 2015). 
Furthermore, the recouvrement was described as totally impossible to avoid given that 
the provincial ÔtaxÕ officials in Mushie have their own motorised boats, hence they can 
pursue those trying to dodge payment.  
 
In contrast to the provincial authorities, both the marines and the Commissariat fluvial 
were portrayed as service providing authorities, implying Ôyou get something for the 
money you payÕ, including documents. For the Commissariat fluvial service provision 
was seen to include the issuing and controlling of permits. As one operator put it: Ôthey 
are needed because it is they who control all the baleinires and also for the money we 
give to them we get a documentÕ (interview, March 2015). The presence of a receipt was 
linked to the belief that the money paid goes to the state treasury. As one operator said: 
Ôthe money we pay goes into the state treasury (caisse ya lÕtat), because they give us a 
proof of payment (preuve de paiement)Õ (interview, March 2015). Conversely, the lack of 
receipts was often referred to as indicating that the money did not go to Ôthe stateÕ, 
thereby delegitimising the presence and ÔtaxationÕ practices of the authorities in question. 
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These findings indicate that in particular when tangible and linked to the experience of 
service provision, symbolic connections to Ôthe stateÕ have strong legitimising effects.  
 
The perception of effective service provision was even stronger in relation to the marines. 
While their relative usefulness was sometimes ascribed to their maintaining security more 
generally, it was mainly attributed to their official rescue mandate. This mandate was 
described as crucial given the difficulty to navigate, and the high level of accidents.  
Importantly, according to most boat operators, the marines do not ask for money when 
they intervene in case of accidents, except for sometimes asking compensation for the 
petrol consumed. Similar to the Commissariat fluvial, the presence of documents also 
played an important role in accounts of the marinesÕ service provision. According to the 
boat operators, cash payments to the marines (which come in addition to providing 
petrol) serve to check and sign the bulletin de bureau mouvement (a document of the 
navyÕs Ôbureau of movementÕ). This document contains information about the boat, 
destination, names of the captain and passengers etc., and is signed by the marines at 
every post down the river. While many contended that they know that these payments are 
not authorised, they were still described as somehow ÔnormalÕ and ÔofficialÕ, as evidenced 
by the fact that at least some sort of document was checked and completed. 
In addition to references to the provided services, the boat operators justified payments to 
the naval forces by referring to the marinesÕ difficult conditions and poor salaries. In the 
words of one operator: Ôthere is no official fee, but there he is, the soldier with his 
difficulties (pasi na ye), asking Òlook for some coffee money for meÓ, and you give himÕ 
(interview, March 2015). The contribution in petrol (most often at the stable rate of five 
litres) was generally also referred to as ÔnormalÕ, as it was contended that the marines Ð 
particularly higher up along the river Ð do not have petrol and need it to do their work. 
This reasoning reflects the notion of Ôpalliative practical normsÕ referred to above, as it 
alludes to (non-official) payments needed for the navy to carry out its ÔofficialÕ mandate 
and engage in service delivery. As one operator put it:  
They donÕt have petrol, they only have the petrol they get from us armateurs 
(boat operators), the small contributions, five litres here, five litres there Ð that 
is what makes them able to do their work (po epermettre bango basala mosala) 
(Interview, March 2015). 
Similar to the boat operators, the marines emphasised that they would not be able to fulfil 
their official mandate, including rescuing civilian boats, without the contributions from 
the boat operators, in particular the fuel.  As one of them put it: Ôit is normal. In case they 
[boat operators] have accidents we are the ones saving them, so it [the fuel] is a 
contribution to that work that we doÕ (interview, November 2014). 
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While collecting reliable data on the distribution of the collected ÔtaxesÕ among the navy 
was difficult, narratives from the marines point to a quite clear system and logic 
regulating the division of the monetary contributions. As one marine explained: Ôwe 
divide the money into three parts: first is the envelope to our superiors in Kinshasa 
(enveloppe ya mikonzi na biso na Kinshasa), second is social security (caisse sociale) and 
the third, that part we divide among the number of marines at the postÕ (interview, 
October 2014). As explained, the enveloppe is sent to Kinshasa, where a part is used for 
the maintenance of the main camp, which also hosts military families, while other parts 
go to the commanders. Depending on the intensity of boat traffic, the total amounts 
collected at each post were reported to be between USD 1600 Ð 2000 per month, of 
which around 30% (USD 500Ð600) goes to the headquarters in Kinshasa (the 
ÔenvelopeÕ). Except for a quite limited amount (USD 110Ð150) allegedly destined for 
social security (medical care or deaths) at the post, the rest is reportedly divided between 
the marines (at the post), amounting to between USD 22 and 90 per marine per month. As 
one naval officer concluded: Ôin short, all get something (bref, batu nionso baliaka 
ndambu ndambu)Õ (interview, October 2014).  
Hence the system of rapportage appears highly institutionalised, contributing to the 
marinesÕ experience of the collection and distribution of resources from boat operators as 
an ÔofficialÕ system that is regulated and sanctioned by their hierarchy. ÔTaxesÕ are 
collected following well-defined rules, and the revenues are at least in part used for 
allowing the naval forces to fulfil their official mandate and provide social security to 
their members. The marines are likely to convey the belief that it concerns an official 
system in interactions with boat operators, thereby influencing the latterÕs narratives and 
perceptions of ÔtaxationÕ.  
Non-official service provision  
While most accounts of Ôfiscal exchangeÕ emphasise the provision of Ôpublic goods and 
servicesÕ, our findings indicate that Ônon-publicÕ (and non-official) services also play a 
role. Some boat operators recounted that the marines assist them with cutting the amounts 
paid to other authorities along the river. Their willingness to pay ÔtaxesÕ to the marines 
was therefore partly connected to the latterÕs capability to help reduce other ÔtaxesÕ. As 
explained earlier, the marines are often the only authority with access to boats with 
engines, enabling them to go out and stop boats that try to bypass a post. This unique 
position allows them to make particular arrangements with boat operators, which consist 
of allowing the operator to pass a post and avoid payment to other authorities in exchange 
for a fee. As one boat operator explained:  
You have to arrange with them [the marines] beforehand, because if you 
donÕt Ð if you pass the post without arranging somehow Ð all the other 
agencies will get into the boats of the marines Ð DGM [migration], 
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Commissariat fluvial and others Ð because they have no boats of their own so 
they will come to collect too with the marines. But if you have arranged with 
the marines, they will just let you pass and if other authorities see, they tell 
them that they cannot go out because they have no fuel [laughing]É. So 
instead of paying 70,000 [FC, approx. USD 58] you can get away with 50,000 
or 30,000 or something (Interview, July 2013)  
In many cases, such bypassing, which was generally described as something you can do 
once or perhaps twice per trip, takes place at night when the boats usually do not travel 
owing to difficulties in navigating. From the boat operatorsÕ accounts, it emerged that the 
money saved can be quite substantial. The fees, however, are negotiable, indicating that 
these arrangements are less institutionalised than other forms of ÔtaxationÕ, which come at 
a quite stable rate. One boat operator described engaging in such negotiations close to 
Maluku:  
I had docked the baleinire just near Maluku and was walking on foot and met the 
marin commander who asked me if all my papers were in order, I told him ÔnoÕ, so 
he asked me what I wanted to do. I said, ÔI want to pass at night to avoid the postÕ. 
So he asked Ôwhat would you pay (formalit) there during the day with the papers 
you have?Õ, I said Ô40,000Õ [FC, approx. USD 33]. So he said, Ôgive me those 
40,000 and I will let you pass and you will save the time, because during the day, if 
you do not have papers, they will bother you a lot (bakocompliquer yo makasi)Õ. 
But I said ÔI do not have 40,000Õ. He said, Ôok then, then give me this (pesa ngai 
boye).Õ I said Õ17,000Õ, he said Ôno!Õ We discussed and discussed Ð in the end I gave 
him 15,000 and he said, Ôok you can go, we will not see your boatÕ, so we passed. 
(Interview, July 2013). 
These arrangements (which can be proposed by either party) are clearly described as a 
win-win solution. As one operator put it:  Ôthey [the marines] do it because they profit (po 
balia), but we also profit, because the harassment from the other authorities is killing us 
(ezoboma biso)Õ (interview, July 2013). Since such practices are sensitive and difficult to 
uncover, it is impossible to assess the extent to which they occur. Moreover, it remains 
unclear whether these arrangements are generalised or only made by a particular type of 
operators. While none of the boat operators confessing to making such arrangements had 
any close (family) bonds with marines, some of them had at times docked their baleinire 
at the Force Navale camp in Kinshasa. Furthermore, those who sometimes chose this 
camp as discharging harbour often argued that they felt more protected and less harassed 
there. In their accounts, docking there also provided them with some protection by 
marines further upstream, limiting potential harassment. As they explained, while 
docking at Force Navale does not imply that you do not have to pay ÔtaxesÕ upstream to 
the marines, it does reduce the risk they will ask you for more. At the same time, it 
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increases the likelihood they will help when you get in trouble with other authorities. For 
instance, one boat operator described how he had been arrested by another state agent, 
and that the marines had helped him to get released, without paying them anything. This 
example indicates how, similar to findings by PrudÕhomme (1992) and Juul (2006), 
assessments of the justification of payments are not only made based on narrow criteria 
of Ôpublic service provisionÕ. They also draw on wider notions of Ômaintaining good 
relationsÕ that often have a dimension of patronage/protection, including the protection of 
non-official and at times illegal practices (such as ÔtaxÕ evasion) (cf. Verweijen 2013).  
 
Conclusions 
Drawing on interviews and surveys among boat operators and marines, this article has 
shed light on the processes and logics shaping views of ÔtaxationÕ on the Congo River. 
We found that the four main factors commonly highlighted in studies on taxpayersÕ views 
and attitudes towards taxation, namely deterrence, reciprocity, social influences and 
(authoritiesÕ) legitimacy (Fjeldstad et al. 2012) indeed all play a role. Yet the data reveals 
that these factors generate effects mostly in interaction, rather than in a stand-alone 
manner. In particular, the notions of both ÔdeterrenceÕ and ÔreciprocityÕ need refinement 
by taking social influences into account, notably the complex workings of Ônon-officialÕ 
logics such as patronage/protection.  
 
The deterrence principle appeared to be at work in relation to both the marines and the 
Commissariat fluvial, in the sense that boat operators were willing to pay ÔtaxesÕ to these 
authorities to avoid getting into trouble. However,  such willingness could not be detected 
in the case of the provincial ÔtaxÕ, which figured as both the most difficult to avoid and 
the most illegitimate. We ascribe these assessments not only to the high level of this 
particular ÔtaxÕ, but also to the perceived lack of the provincial authorityÕs Ôsocial 
contentÕ, including the absence of (the potential for) both ÔofficialÕ and Ônon-officialÕ 
service provision. This authority is only encountered at one post and is little susceptible 
to negotiations, hence maintaining good relations will not benefit boat operators in other 
parts of their journey or in other dimensions of their business. In a similar vein, the 
importance of ÔdeterrenceÕ not only lies in avoiding the coercive capabilities of the 
authority in question being used against you, but also in ensuring that these capabilities 
are potentially deployed in your favour, including via the protection of less ÔofficialÕ 
practices. After all, those capable of inflicting most harm also tend to be those capable of 
offering the best protection, including in non-official domains (Chabal and Daloz 1999). 
In sum, in our study, ÔdeterrenceÕ did not work as a stand-alone factor but was assessed in 
conjunction with a range of other factors, including more and less official service 
provision.  
 
Furthermore and importantly, the notion of deterrence was clearly not only seen in terms 
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of physical force, but was also related to administrative coercion (e.g. withholding 
permits), and intransigence. Hence, although a military actor, the navy was not 
experienced as the most ÔdeterrentÕ, which in turn puts the relative importance of arms-
bearing into perspective. Additionally, where the navy engaged in practices forbidden by 
the law and seen as less licitÐsuch as facilitating ÔtaxÕ evasionÐthis also occurred on the 
explicit demand of boat operators themselves, and not through one-sided imposition by 
force. 
 
The dimension of non-official service provision also draws attention to the need to 
nuance the fiscal exchange or reciprocity principle. In spite of a substantial body of 
research highlighting that taxpayers also pay contributions in relation to expectations of 
(potential) reciprocity in non-official ways (PrudÕhomme 1992; Juul 2006; Prichard and 
Van den Boogaard 2017), fiscal exchange continues to be conceptualised in terms of 
Ôpublic service provisionÕ. In the case analysed here, the marines were perceived as 
relatively useful given their capability to make arrangements allowing for paying less 
ÔtaxesÕ to other authorities. It is likely that feelings about the marinesÕ relative utility that 
stem from their provision of less official services also find their way into discourses 
normalising and legitimising naval practices that draw on registers of ÔofficialityÕ. Hence, 
non-official service provision may affect overall assessments of an authorityÕs relative 
legitimacy, in this way also shaping perceptions of its practices of ÔtaxationÕ. As argued 
by Verweijen (2013) in relation to the eastern CongoÕs Kivu provinces, the FARDC have 
a measure of legitimacy there based on their engagement both in forms of security 
provision that correspond to and evoke the idea of Ôthe stateÕ and more private protection 
services. Our research demonstrates that in spite of a different security situationÐnotably 
the absence of armed groups and less banditryÐsimilar factors underlie the relative 
legitimacy of the FARDC navy in the Bandundu area of the western Congo. One 
explanation for this could be that the navyÕs mandate of riverine rescue still provides a 
sense of Ô(public) security provisionÕ read in conjunction with ÔstatenessÕ.  
 
The sense that the navy engages in Ôpublic service provisionÕ is strongly reinforced by 
their invocation of discourses of ÔstatenessÕ. The navy frequently references its official 
mandate, enshrined in legislation such as the 2011 Defence Law, including in a 
ÔpalliativeÕ sense (Olivier de Sardan 2015) (e.g. to justify Ônon-officialÕ practices that 
allegedly enable the execution of their official mandate). Yet as demonstrated by the fact 
that the 2014 interministerial decree had limited influence on what ÔtaxesÕ were perceived 
as ÔofficialÕ, referring to legislation or official mandates is not a sufficient criterion for 
ÔofficialityÕ. What also matters is whether practices evoke Ôthe idea of the stateÕ in a more 
tangible way, like by involving (physical) symbols of ÔofficialityÕ such as documents 
(that may well have no ÔofficialÕ status according to legislation such as the navyÕs bulletin 
de bureau mouvement). Other factors that shape perceptions of ÔofficialityÕ are whether 
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practices are institutionalised and routinised, and are authorised and regulated by 
hierarchies, as is the case with rapportage. These different factors, in turn, interact in 
complex ways with yet other elements in shaping perceptions of ÔofficialityÕ, in particular 
authoritiesÕ power/importance and overall legitimacy. As concluded by Titeca and De 
Herdt (2011), the symbolic power of Ôthe stateÕ is socially constructed and negotiated, 
and while many different actors may evoke the idea of Ôthe stateÕ, the effects of such 
invocation are shaped by power plays.  
 
By acknowledging that ÔofficialityÕ is shaped by a range of criteria, which often diverge 
depending on the situation and authority, notions of ÔofficialityÕ and Ônon-officialityÕ (and 
relatedly, formality/informality) are better conceptualised as (contextual) processes than 
as absolute qualities with a dichotomous status. In the light of this fluidity, our findings 
caution against the a priori use of the labels ÔformalÕ and ÔinformalÕ, for instance the 
tendency to frame all taxation not enacted in accordance to laws as ÔinformalÕ. These a 
priori labels might limit our understanding of the nature and workings of the socially 
constructed boundaries between Ôthe officialÕ and Ôthe non-officialÕ, potentially masking 
the ways in which Ôthe non-officialÕ is not only deeply entangled in Ð but also reproduces 
and at times merges withÐ Ôthe officialÕ. Hence, any effort to understand logics around 
ÔtaxationÕ (including why certain ÔtaxesÕ persist in spite of being legally banned) must 
probe deeply into emic (rather than pre-determined) notions of ÔofficialityÕ and Ônon-
officialityÕ and how they shape views of ÔtaxationÕ of both taxpayers and tax collectors Ð 
in different and often shifting ways. 
 
 
Notes 
																																																								
1
 Owing to security concerns, we have withheld the names of the research assistants. 
2
 Approximate price for buying 100 Ð 200 bags in the inland, consisting of an equal mix of fufu and maize.  
3
 The following ministries: 1) Transport; 2) Interior; 3) Environment; 4) Culture and Arts; 5) Economy and 
Commerce; 6) Finance; 7) Infrastructure, and 8) Defence. 
4
 Since the camp is too small to host all families, many rent housing from civilians around the camp.  
5
 Ôassister les navires, embarcations et aronefs en dtresse dans les eauxs territorialesÕ. See Loi organique 
2011.!!!
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